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that war cannot be laid upon the shoulders of any single people. Germany believes, also, that a policy of duress and coercion will not bring about the reconstruction of international economic life, and that only by way of peaceful discussion and understanding can such reconstruction be obtained. The German Government considers it important to give, with solemn emphasis, the assurance that for its part it is honestly willing to follow the path which it has suggested.

#### SECRETARY HUGHES' REPLY

On March 29 Secretary Hughes replied briefly, but unmistakably:

The American Government is pleased to note in the informal memorandum of Dr. Simons the unequivocal expression on the part of the German Government of its desire to afford reparation up to the limit of German ability to pay. government stands with the governments of the allies in holding Germany responsible for the war and therefore morally bound to make reparation, so far as may be possible. The recognition of this obligation, implied in the memorandum of Dr. Simons, seems to the government of the United States the only sound basis on which can be built a firm and just peace under which the various nations of Europe can achieve once more economic independence and stability.

This government believes that it recognizes in the memorandum of Dr. Simons a sincere desire on the part of the German Government to reopen negotiations with the allies on a new basis, and hopes that such negotiations, once resumed, may lead to a prompt settlement which will at the same time satisfy the just claims of the allies and permit Germany hopefully to renew its productive activities.

#### M. VIVIANI'S MISSION

### Formal Errand Stated—Plea for American Co-operation

A special envoy from the Republic of France to the United States, M. Viviani, left Paris on the 19th for New York and Washington. He arrived in Washington on March 29, and on the 30th paid his formal respects to President Harding, being introduced by Secretary of State Hughes. On April 5 he was formally banqueted at the White House. Nominally his mission, so far as officially interpreted in Paris, was to convey to the American people and to the new Administration the felicitations of France and her renewed pledges of abiding friendship; but conjecture of correspondents and comments of Parisian editors assigned to him other and ulterior motives. Of these the more conspicuous were the following: Advocacy of the United States entering the League of Nations, albeit on its own terms. Arrangement of terms of settlement of France's debt to the United States. Formation of an "understanding" between the two republics as to a Russian policy involving no recognition of the Soviet Government, not even on an economic basis such as Great Britain, Italy, and Japan were then said to have perfected. Argument against a "peace with Germany" by the United States that would seem to imply desertion of the Allies, especially at an hour when they are enforcing the provisions of a treaty which the United States signed as covictor.

In an article furnished by him to the American press and published generally the day before he landed in New York City, on March 28, the former French Premier wrote:

The greatest problem today is the League of Nations. An exchange of views, therefore, is better than silence, even if it should not result in an agreement. We in France have

been blamed for accepting the League from President Wilson without first inquiring if it was approved by the United States Senate. Certainly, out of respect for the American nation, we could not question Mr. Wilson's right to speak for his country. It is to be regretted that this puristic political misunderstanding, resulting from our very respect for the laws and officials of the United States, continues.

The situation with respect to the League, however, may

be summed up as follows:

1. The League of Nations pact has been ratified by France, England, Italy, Belgium, and others. We hope that America, while dissatisfied herself, will appreciate the fact that these countries have accomplished an act which they cannot repudiate.

#### Subject to Revision

2. The pact proclaims itself subject to revision. I am a member of the committee on amendments. Forty already have been proposed. Others undoubtedly will be.

3. The pact no longer belongs to governments. The League alone is sovereign and alone has the power of modification.

- 4. The co-operation of America is indispensable to humanity. America's presence always is desirable at any meetings of minds and consciences.
- 5. American statesmen seem determined on the destruction of the covenant. Article X, they say, is a threat against national independence; it creates a super-government. Article X is objectionable for very different reasons. It merely authorizes suggestions and therefore promises more than it can fulfill.
- 6. Whatever may be one's conception, a league, a society, or an association means reciprocal obligations. When two individuals form a partnership they seek to increase their separate strength in collective strength, but they also undertake certain obligations toward each other. If we do not wish to do this, it would be far better for us to remain separate.

#### Must Assume Obligations

7. Whatever sort of combination is proposed—if it really is to be a combination—there must be an exchange of duties and rights by the associates. So, if Americans desire to form a combination, the question is how will they form an association without committing themselves to anything or without receiving commitments in return?

8. Some persons complain that the League is a political organism which should be replaced by a judicial organism. We already have had The Hague Court, composed of eminent jurists. In the past they have done their best, but they

never have been obeyed.

9. The League in September last created a court of justice, which was accepted by all of its members; by some instantly, by others in accordance with the procedure required by their constitution.

10. If a court is established, nations must not bring before it merely their commercial, industrial, and economic interests. Indeed no, for we are striving toward the time when conflicts of national pride, which are of the gravest sort, because they stir up entire populations, thereby becoming irremediable, will likewise be settled judicially. Unless these conflicts are brought immediately before the court, the most profound and most poisonous causes of war would be beyond its jurisdiction.

#### Court an Impairment

11. Even those who desire only a court restricted in its consideration and authority to purely economic questions must realize that membership in such a court diminishes to some extent national independence. Whenever a man or nation, instead of taking justice in its own hands, defers to the decision of another, there may be said to have been a certain abdication of sovereignty.

12. Since no international organization, whether it be called league or court, can be joined without some sacrifice of individual initiative, one must be logical and straightforward, and either refuse adhesion, so as to remain completely independent, or gain through the collective strength of association a greater power than would be possible for one to possess alone.

13. When the court is through deliberating, what is to become of its decisions? Will they be theoretical decisions, the enforcement of which will depend on the good faith of the parties in the cause? In that case we may as well say that the fruits of war have not been gathered. If, after that great calamity, we are not further advanced than The Hague Court, whose decisions even when unanimous concerning the laws of war, were trampled derisively, truly the war has taught us nothing. The court of justice, whatever its form, will be either a laughing-stock or a power. It cannot be a power unless it is armed with means to enforce international sentences against refractory nations.

14. The idea of a court of justice, even if the court is separated from the League, cannot avail much unless peoples form an association at whose door they will lay aside, in appearance at least, their sovereignty. I say in appearance, for when I join any association I don't abandon my independence, but I do add it to the independence of others.

#### MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

On the 31st M. Viviani issued a message to the American people to this effect, the same being his first formal official utterance:

I have accepted the mission with which the government of my country has honored me with a deeper joy, as by entrusting me with the mandate of bringing to President Harding the wishes which friendly France forms for him and for his administration I could have the opportunity, through you, to hail America, whole America.

I came here in other times, tragical and dark, which, however, shine for me with all the enthusiasm projected by the past.

#### Nothing Will Break Ties

This enthusiasm gave me the comfort which is so necessary to continue the struggle.

You may imagine the sacred emotion which I felt when returning among you. Let me express to you this emotion in my message.

Never will America, whole America, know the gratitude

of my country for her.

From the Pacific to the Atlantic, from north to south, on this magnificent land, where all races and confessions are splendidly and harmoniously mingled, our mind finds anew the generous sons and the valiant daughters to whom we owe so great a debt.

Nothing will ever break the ties of the heart which unite to your republic France, France who has suffered so much for right, who asks only for justice, and who hopes for the salvation of humanity through a better world.

#### M. VIVIANI FORMALLY ON RECORD

On March 5, after having had repeated conversations with Senators Lodge, Knox, and other of the Senate leaders, and after having entered into a debate with Senator Borah at a dinner given him by Senator McCormick, where his fellow-guests were members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, M. Viviani sent out to the American people the following statement:

M. Viviani, who, since his arrival in Washington has been received by numerous notables, has been greatly touched by the cordiality which all have shown to him, a cordiality which was extended through him to France, of which he is the representative. He has heard much and has responded as best he could in view of his mission, which is to inform the American people of the condition of France and to inform himself concerning American opinion.

He has observed with deep feeling, in the course of the legal and political discussions which involved the treaty of peace, a unanimous sentiment favorable to France, for which, in recognition of her past valiance and present difficulty, all America has preserved its affection.

In the course of these different discussions and for the sole purpose of conversation, M. Viviani has been obliged to envisage every hypothesis, even those which his opinion opposes, to the end of weighing with his conferees the elements of good and evil.

## SUPREME COUNCIL AND LEAGUE "MANDATES"

# United States Denies Their Validity—Yap Not for Japan Alone

On May 7 the Supreme Council in Paris gave Japan a "mandate" over the island of Yap, in the North Pacific, an island important chiefly for its site as a cable landing station. During the last weeks of the Wilson administration the attitude of the Japanese Government toward exclusive use of this island for purposes of intercontinental communications were the subject of diplomatic negotiations. Japan's disposition to fall back on the undivided authority conferred by the "mandate" of the Allies was shown in this correspondence.

The Harding administration, through Secretary of State Hughes, has reiterated the American argument, but has given it a wider scope and fuller discussion in a virtually identic letter sent to Japan, Great Britain, France, and Italy. These nations now know that the United States, though not signatory to the Versailles Treaty nor a member of the League of Nations, intends, as co-victor in the war, to have something to say about any distribution of former German territory.

Following is the text of Secretary Hughes' letter as it went, April 4, to Great Britain:

With respect to the mandate to Japan, purporting to have been confirmed and defined in its terms by the Supreme Council of the League of Nations, of the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator, this government deems it appropriate to state the fundamental basis of its representations and the principles which, in its view, are determinative.

It will not be questioned that the right to dispose of the overseas possessions of Germany was acquired only through the victory of the allied and associated powers, and it is also believed that there is no disposition on the part of the British Government to deny the participation of the United States in that victory. It would seem to follow necessarily that the right accruing to the allied and associated powers through the common victory is shared by the United States, and that there could be no valid or effective disposition of the overseas possessions of Germany, now under consideration, without the assent of the United States.

This government must, therefore, point out that, as the United States has never vested either the Supreme Council or the League of Nations with any authority to bind the United States or to act on its behalf, there has been no opportunity for any decision which could be deemed to affect the rights of the United States. It may also be observed that the right accruing to the United States through the victory in which it has participated could not be regarded as in any way ceded or surrendered to Japan or to other nations except by treaty, and that no such treaty has been made.

#### Failure of Treaty No Bar

The fact that the United States has not ratified the Treaty of Versailles cannot detract from rights which the United States had already acquired, and it is hardly necessary to suggest that a treaty to which the United States is not a party could not affect these rights. But it should be noted that the Treaty of Versailles did not purport to secure to